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Epistemology and Cultivation in Jingying Huiyuan’s Essay on 
the Three Means of Valid Cognition 
Chen-kuo Lin 
It is a wide-spread impression that Buddhist epistemology (pramāṇa-
vāda) never received any serious attention outside of the development of 
Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. Current scholarship clearly shows that Chinese 
textual sources in this field have been totally ignored, owing to the belief 
that they are unhelpful, if not perhaps entirely useless, for our under-
standing of Buddhist epistemology in its original form. According to this 
belief, all that we find of this particular aspect of Indian Buddhism in the 
Chinese heritage is the scholastic tradition of hetu-vidyā (“the science of 
reason”), and especially the early system of Dignāga (ca. 480-‌540), which 
was brought back to China by Xuanzang in the seventh century. Before 
Xuanzang, as Giuseppe Tucci noted nearly a century ago, there were also 
some Chinese translations of pre-Dignāga texts, which are only useful for 
reconstructing the early history of Buddhist logic in India.1  
In this paper, however, I will demonstrate that the Chinese record 
preserves more than this. I will present a textual and doctrinal study of 
Jingying Huiyuan’s 淨影慧遠 (523-592) Essay on the Three Means of Valid 
Cognition (San liang zhi yi 三量智義, hereafter SLZY), a gem among early 
Chinese Buddhist epistemological treatises. I will aim to show that the 
-------------------------------------------------- 
1 I am especially grateful to Katsura Shōryū, Michael Radich and an anonymous reviewer 
for invaluable comments and proofreading. Their uncompromising insights saved my 
work from confusion in many places, though any remaining faults are mine alone. 
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Chinese reception of Indian Buddhist epistemology before the era of 
Xuanzang was far more significant than has been previously assumed.2  
Before exploring Huiyuan’s contribution, I will give a brief historical 
picture of the way that Buddhist epistemology was introduced from 
India to China during the fifth and sixth centuries. This picture will be 
drawn from two angles: first, a brief chronological sketch; and second, a 
topical reconstruction.  
As far as the chronological background is concerned, it is important 
to look into Kumārajīva’s (350-413) early fifth century translations of 
Āryadeva’s Śata-śāstra, Qingmu’s (青目 *Piṅgala) Commentary on Nāgār-
juna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, and the *Satyasiddhi-śāstra. In those early 
translations, Indian logic and epistemology was introduced to China for 
the first time. Some early materials relating to Buddhist logic and episte-
mology were also preserved in the last chapter of the Saṃdhinirmocana-
sūtra and the Bodhisattvabhūmi, where four methods of reasoning (yukti) 
were found. These texts were first translated in the first half of the fifth 
century.  
Subsequently, before Huiyuan composed the SLZY, some other early 
Indian texts of logic and epistemology were also translated into Chinese. 
In 472, Jijiaye (吉迦夜) and Tanyao (曇曜) translated the *Upāyahṛ-
daya-śāstra (方便心論), the authorship of which is disputably ascribed to 
Nāgārjuna. In 538-541, *Gautama Prajñāruci (瞿曇般若流支) translated 
Vasubandhu’s Viṃśatikā and co-translated with *Vimokṣa Prajñārṣi (毘目
智仙) Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī. In 542, Vimokṣa Prajñārṣi trans-
lated Asaṅga’s *Madhyāntānugama-śāstra (順中論). In 550-569, Para-
mārtha translated Vasubandhu’s *Tarka-śāstra (如實論), retranslated the 
same author’s Viṃśatikā, and translated Dignāga’s Ālambanaparīkṣā. It 
seems that most of those early translations were not accessible to 
Huiyuan. However, those materials provide us with useful sources to 
reconstruct the ways Chinese thinkers viewed Indian debates on some 
philosophical and religious topics. As we will see later, translation always 
-------------------------------------------------- 
2 To my knowledge, Takemura Shōhō (武邑尚邦) is the only scholar who has briefly 
mentioned the pioneering contribution of Huiyuan’s San liang zhi yi in the Chinese 
reception of hetu-vidyā. See Takemura, 1986. 
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implicitly embodies the pre-understanding of the recipient. Those early 
Chinese translations are no exception. 
In order to present a topical background to the subject of the present 
study, I have chosen three topics that were pervasive in these early 
translation texts: first, theological issues, such as arguments for the exis-
tence of a soul (ātman, puruṣa) and cosmic creators (Īśvara, Viṣṇu); 
second, the metaphysical problem of the existence of the external world; 
and third, the relationship between epistemology and meditation, in 
which, as my study will show, Huiyuan is much more interested. 
Theological topics 
In Kumārajīva’s translation of Qingmu’s (*Piṅgala) Commentary on MMK, 
four means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) are employed for the first time 
to argue for the non-existence of the soul (ātman). The word ātman is 
either rendered by wo (我) or shen (神) in Chinese. It was through Ku-
mārajīva’s translation that Chinese readers came to know that belief in 
the ātman played a significant role in ancient Indian religions. For Indi-
ans, one achieves spiritual liberation only when the ātman is liberated 
from the cycle of rebirth. However, whether the ātman exists or not is an 
issue of debate between various Indian systems. A famous example can 
be found in the earliest record of Indian logic, the Carakasaṃhitā, where 
the five-step syllogism was used to argue for the eternity (nitya) of the 
soul (puruṣa) (Kajiyama, 1984: 11).  
In Qingmu’s Commentary, four pramāṇas are used rather to argue 
against the ātmavāda. These pramāṇas are mentioned as being: (1) 
perception (pratyakṣa); (2) inference (anumāna), which is subdivided into 
inference from effect to cause (*pūrvavat), inference from part to whole 
(*śeṣavat) and inference from general correlation (*sāmānyatoḍṛṣṭa); (3) 
analogy (upamāna); and (4) authority (āptāgama). Inference, analogy and 
authority are all said to function on the basis of perception. Qingmu 
argued that, given this epistemic priority of perception, and given that 
no one has seen a soul, there is no epistemic ground upon which know-
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ledge of the existence of the soul could arise through the other three 
means of cognition.3  
It is worthy of note that Kumārajīva rendered the Sanskrit term 
pramāṇa by xin (信), which literally means “trust”, “warrant”, and 
“assurance”.4 This rendering was replaced by zhi (智 jñāna, cognition) 
in later Chinese translations. Both xin and zhi refer to a certain form of 
mental state, which is considered the foundation of cognition. However, 
Kumārajīva’s rendering preserves the early Chinese understanding of 
the meaning of pramāṇa, namely, that the means of knowledge must be 
trustworthy.  
After Kumārajīva, logical arguments against the existence of a soul 
and a cosmic creator are also found in more detail in such early Buddhist 
logical texts as the Upāyahṛdaya, the Madhyāntānugama-śāstra, and the 
Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya.  
Metaphysical topics 
In addition to such theological issues, Buddhist philosophical schools, 
such as Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, Madhyamaka, and Yogācāra, turned 
their attention to metaphysical questions: What is an existent (dharma)? 
Do existents possess essence or substance (svabhāva)?5 Does the world 
exist independent of mind? In response to these questions, the Sarvāsti-
vādin argues for a form of direct realism, while the Sautrāntika argues 
-------------------------------------------------- 
3 See Zhong lun (中論), T30:1564.24a-24b. 
4 The word xin (信) in this context could be taken to mean “reliability”, as testified by the 
use of the phrase kexin (可信) in Kumārajīva’s translation.  
5 Jan Westerhoff distinguishes two usages of svabhāva in Mādhyamika philosophy: (1) 
svabhāva as essence and (2) svabhāva as substance. Essence-svabhāva refers to the speci-
fic property of an object by which it is distinguished from the other objects. Substance-
‌svabhāva is employed as an ontological notion, meaning “primary existent” in the sense 
that it is free of causal law. It is the permanent foundation of impermanent phenomena. 
Westerhoff concludes that “The elaborate Mādhyamika criticism of the notion of sva-
bhāva is directed against this stronger notion of substance-svabhāva rather than against 
essence-svabhāva.” See Westerhoff, 2009: 19-29. However, I would like to emphasize that 
the ontological notion of substance-svabhāva should not be separated from the episte-
mological notion of essence-svabhāva. 
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for indirect realism. In contrast, the Mādhyamika claims that all objects 
are empty, in the sense of being void of substance, whereas the 
Yogācārin takes an idealist position, contending that existents should be 
understood as mental representations only. In India, these philosophical 
controversies were to be settled only on the basis of logical argument 
and epistemological justification. Even though the early Mādhyamikas 
questioned the legitimacy of logic and epistemology, they still needed to 
argue for their positions according to certain rules of dialectics. The best 
evidence of this fact can be found in Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī, a 
philosophical text that was translated, but unfortunately ignored 
throughout the entire history of Chinese Buddhism.  
On the side of Yogācāra, Vasubandhu’s Viṃśatikā was first translated 
by Gautama Prajñāruci in 538-541. In this text, Vasubandhu employed 
four pramāṇas to argue for idealism (vijñaptimātra) and against realism, 
by appealing to the same epistemological premise: “The existence and 
nonexistence [of objects] are to be determined by means of valid cogni-
tion” (pramāṇavaśād astitvaṃ nāstitvaṃ vā nirdhāryate).6 That is to say, 
metaphysical questions with regard to the existence of external objects 
can be answered only through epistemological justification. As we can 
see from Huiyuan’s writings, this typical Indian philosophical practice 
did not win much appreciation from early Chinese Buddhists.  
Topics on epistemology and meditation 
Now we come to Huiyuan’s SLZY which can be viewed as an example 
showing interest in the relationship between epistemology and medi-
tation. In contrast to the persistence of Indian Buddhist philosophers in 
engaging in theological and metaphysical debate, Huiyuan clearly does 
not show interest in the practice of logic and epistemological analysis. 
His writing style shows itself more in favor of hermeneutic exegesis than 
argumentation. In his exegesis, moreover, he places great stress on the 
meditational context in which he believes epistemology is properly to be 
situated. By “meditational context”, I mean that he refers to the stages of 
-------------------------------------------------- 
6 Also see Xuanzang’s translation of the Viṃśatikā: 諸法由量刊定有無. T31:1690.76b.15.  
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meditational cultivation as explained in the *Abhidharmavibhāṣā and 
Yogācāra texts. According to those early texts, various stages of medita-
tion practice correspond to various levels of mental experience, which 
are depicted according to the system of the three realms (tridhātu). That 
is, mental experience at the level of the desire-realm (kāmadhātu) is con-
sidered different from that in the form- and formless realms (rūpadhātu, 
ārūpyadhātu). Accordingly, when we analyze perception, we have to dif-
ferentiate the various forms of perception in accordance with the vari-
ous levels of mental experience that can be observed at the various stag-
es of meditational practice.  
Similarly, Huiyuan contends that when we are doing epistemological 
analysis, we have to ascertain the meditational stage at which the object 
is discerned. Our mental experience, including perception and inference, 
depends upon the various levels of mental development. Hence, per-
ception and inference cannot be conceived as something universal and 
unchanging. In this regard, Huiyuan is more concerned with cognitive 
variation in mental cultivation than with the a priori conditions of 
knowledge as they might be conceived, for example, in Kantian epis-
temology. 
Huiyuan did not have any knowledge of Dignāga’s system. Rather, he 
attempted independently to derive an understanding of Buddhist logic 
and epistemology from pre-Dignāgan sources. It will be illuminating, 
therefore, if we strategically place Huiyuan and Dignāga side by side, to 
see the different paths they took in confronting the same tradition of 
hetu-vidyā.  
The most apparent difference between the two thinkers is that Dig-
nāga admits two means of valid cognition only (i.e., pratyakṣa and anu-
māna), while Huiyuan admits three (adding āgama to Dignāga’s two). 
Dignāga accepts only two means of cognition, perception and inference, 
for the reason that the object itself only presents two aspects to cogni-
tion, namely, the particular (svalakṣaṇa) and the universal (sāmānyalak-
ṣaṇa). Dignāga argues that no third means of cognition can be accepted 
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because ontologically, there is no other aspect of the object, beside the 
particular and the universal, that could serve as the object of cognition.7  
On the other hand, Huiyuan contends that each of the three means of 
cognition has both the particular (shi 事) and the universal (li 理) as 
objects of cognition. That is, perception is directed at both the particular 
and the universal as the object of cognition; and the same is also true for 
inference; and for authoritative teaching. At first sight, this theory looks 
to be totally at odds with Dignāga’s system. How can this be explained? 
In order to explain Huiyuan’s theory of cognition, I suggest that we 
should look into his ontology of the prameya, which takes both li and shi 
as the object of each means of cognition.  
Text, author, and context 
The text under study is Huiyuan’s Essay on the Three Means of Valid 
Cognition (SLZY), a chapter in his magnum opus, A Compendium of the Great 
Vehicle (Dasheng yizhang 大乘義章 = DSYZ). As recorded in Daoxuan’s 道
宣 (596-667) Further Biographies of Eminent Monks (Xu gaoseng zhuan 續高
僧傳), Huiyuan composed DSYZ in fourteen fascicles, and the text 
consists of two hundred and fifty-nine entries in five categories of doc-
trine: (1) the Canon; (2) Foundational Doctrine; (3) Defiled Dharmas; (4) 
Purified Dharmas; and (5) Miscellaneous Dharmas. Daoxuan describes 
this text as follows: “The essentials of the Buddha’s teaching are all laid 
out here, for scholars who want to grasp the gist of the teaching” (T50:‌
2060.‌491c).  
However, the genre of DSYZ, that is, Mahāyāna Abhidharma, was not 
invented by Huiyuan. Rather, it can be traced back to the writings of 
Kumārajīva, who is said to have authored a text with the same title in 
three fascicles. The same title of “compendium” (yizhang) was also seen 
in many works by Huiyuan’s contemporaries, such as Fashang (法上, 
495-580) (T50:2060.485c), Shi Lingyu (釋靈裕, 518-605) (T50:2060.497c), 
Shi Tanwuzui (釋曇無最, d.u.) (T50:2060.624c), Shi Daobian (釋道辯, d.u.) 
(T50:2060.471c) and Shi Baoqiong (釋寶瓊, 504-584) (T50:2060.479c). This 
-------------------------------------------------- 
7 This is exactly why Candrakīrti took issue with Dignāga in the opening chapter of the 
Prasannapadā. 
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shows that the genre of the Mahāyāna compendium was widely adopted 
by Chinese Buddhists during the fifth and sixth centuries, in order to 
systematize their understanding of the Dharma.8  
Within the overall structure of DSYZ, SLZY is included under the cate-
gory of Purified Dharmas. The SLZY can be considered an independent 
work, but this does not mean that it does not need to be properly 
contextualized within the historical process of the scriptural transmis-
sion of DSYZ as a whole. As we can see from the SLZY itself, Huiyuan 
composed this chapter by citing from various early translations of Indian 
texts, such as:  
(1) Xiangxu jietuo rulai suozuo suishun liaoyi jing (*Saṃdhinirmocanatathā-
gatakṛtyānuṣṭhānanītārtha-sūtra 相續解脫如來所作隨順了義經 ), 
translated by Guṇabhadra (394-468) in the middle of the fifth century. 
This text can be identified as the last chapter of the Saṃdhinirmocana-
sūtra, where four methods of reasoning (yukti) are discussed, placing 
it among the oldest materials in Buddhist logic and epistemology. It is 
also important to note that the problem of the three pramāṇas is 
found in the same context as the four yuktis.  
(2) The Bodhisattvabhūmi (Pusa dichi jing 菩薩地持經), translated by 
Dharmakṣema (曇無讖) in 418. Huiyuan also refers to a passage on the 
four yuktis which appears in this text.  
(3) The *Satyasiddhi-śāstra (Cheng shi lun 成實論), translated by Ku-
mārajīva in 411-412.  
(4) Āryadeva’s *Śataka-śāstra (Bai lun 百論), also translated by Ku-
mārajīva. 
(5) The *Abhidharmavibhāṣā (Apitan piposha lun 阿毘曇毘婆沙論), 
translated by Daotai (道泰 ) and Buddhavarman (佛陀跋摩 ) in 
425-427. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
8 The popularity of yizhang in the sixth-century Dilun school can be seen in the newly 
discovered Dunhuang manuscripts. See Aoki, et al., 2012. 
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Doctrinal analysis 
In the SLZY, Huiyuan lays out an exposition of the three pramāṇas in the 
scholastic style. The essay as a whole is divided into three sections: (1) 
“Exposition of terminology”, which defines the meaning and usage of 
the three pramāṇas; (2) “Examination of characteristics”, which gives 
further clarification; and (3) “Analysis in accordance with the ranks of 
cultivation”, where issues of pramāṇa are placed in the context of medi-
tative cultivation. The first two sections are often combined, as in many 
other entries in the DSYZ.  
Instead of presenting Huiyuan’s doctrine of pramāṇas within his own 
hermeneutic framework, I will focus on Huiyuan’s epistemology as it 
relates to ontology and meditation. For Huiyuan, epistemology and onto-
logy will make no sense if they are not placed within the context of 
meditation. Hence, it is the main aim of this paper to demonstrate that 
only when the context of epistemology and meditation has been proper-
ly exposed are we able to fully understand the soteriological project in 
the early stage of Chinese Buddhist logico-epistemology. 
In the first section of SLZY, Huiyuan elucidates the meaning of the 
pramāṇas, treating pratyakṣa, anumāna and āptāgama respectively. In this 
discussion, he refers to Guṇabhadra’s translation of the Saṃdhinirmoca-
na-‌sūtra, Dharmakṣema’s translation of the Bodhisattvabhūmi and 
Kumārajīva’s translation of the *Satyasiddhi-śāstra. Based on these early 
texts, Huiyuan uses the term liang (量, “measure of cognition”), which is 
the Chinese rendering of pramāṇa, to refer to “the specific capacity of the 
discerning mind which apprehends the specific aspect of the object” (慧
心取法，各有分限，故名為量; SLZY, T44:1851.670c7-8). That is, the mind 
with the various functions of discernment (prajñā), which is none other 
than the mind of cognition, apprehends specific aspects of the object of 
cognition. It is also called “prajñā-mind” (huixin 慧心) due to its capabil-
ity to cognize with certainty at the stage of seeing (darśana-mārga) (DSYZ, 
T44:1851.642b, 672c). Once again, we note that by referring to the various 
stages of meditation the analysis of cognition is clearly conducted within 
the context of cultivational practice. 
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Perception 
The first means of cognition is named pratyakṣa, which is rendered in 
Chinese by xian (現), with various connotations. In Huiyuan’s own words, 
pratyakṣa is defined either as the immediate cognition (xianzhi 現知) of 
existents, or as the cognition of present existents (xianfa 現法).9 Here 
we see the difference between Huiyuan’s interpretation and Indian ety-
mological exegesis. In India, as Masaaki Hattori points out, both the 
Naiyāyikas and Dignāga agreed that pratyakṣa is so named either because 
it is closely connected with (prati) each sense faculty, or because it is the 
function of each sense faculty (akṣa) toward (prati) its object. That is, 
pratyakṣa literally means what immediately appears to the sense facul-
ty.10 Although Indian etymological exegesis of this sort would have been 
beyond Huiyuan’s knowledge, it is not surprising to see that his inter-
pretation is not too far from the conventional Indian etymology of praty-
akṣa as “direct apprehension” (sākṣātkārijñāna) (Chattopadhyay, 2007: 81-‌
82). 
Huiyuan further analyzes perception into two types. The first type of 
perception is cognition of a particular (“fact”, “thing”, shi 事), while the 
second type is cognition of a universal (“truth”, “principle”, li 理). Here 
we see the most striking peculiarity in Huiyuan’s theory of knowledge, 
for he brings a pair of Sinitic notions, li and shi, to bear upon the theory 
of pramāṇa. As we will see below, the terms li and shi play a central role 
in Huiyuan’s doctrinal system. Now, we have to bear in mind that this 
usage is not confined to Huiyuan’s theory of knowledge; basically, this 
pair of ontological concepts was used by Chinese Buddhists to account 
for the theory of the Two Truths. In the context of SLZY, however, it is 
quite certain that the term li refers to the “universal” and the term shi 
refers to the “particular”, as generally used in Indian epistemology. At 
-------------------------------------------------- 
9 In other chapters, the term xianfa (現法) is taken to mean the object of pratyakṣa (xian-
zhi 現智), which is immediately present to perception. See DSYZ, T44:1581.642c, 756c. 
10 現現別轉，故名現量 (NMukh, 3b.17) akṣam akṣaṁ prati vartata iti pratyakṣam (pratyakṣa 
is so named because it occurs in close connection with [prati] each sense faculty 
[akṣa]); Nyāya: akṣasyâkṣasya prativiṣayaṁ vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam (“Pratyakṣa is the function of 
each sense-organ [akṣa] toward [prati] its object”) (Hattori, 1968: 76-77). 
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this point, we have to be cautious; reading Chinese phrases by merely 
tracing back to the Sanskrit “origin” is not enough, because we might 
lose the subtle nuances of terms that have been shaped by Chinese 
semantic contexts.  
Huiyuan first treats perception as cognition of shi (the fact/thing, i.e. 
the particular), defining it as “cognition without the aid of inference and 
verbal testimony”. It is obvious that this definition of pratyakṣa merely 
distinguishes it from the other means of valid cognition. Comparison 
shows that at least on the surface, this definition is reminiscent of Dig-
nāga’s definition in PS (V).I.3c-d: “Perception is free from conceptual 
construction, the association of name, genus, etc.” (pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpo-
ḍhaṃ nāmajatyādiyojanā) (Hattori, 1968: 25; Steinkellner, 2005), in which 
“free from conceptual construction” can be taken to match Huiyuan’s 
“without the aid of inference”, and “free from the association of name, 
genus, etc.” corresponds to Huiyuan’s “without the aid of verbal testi-
mony”. The difference is that Huiyuan was not as well-informed as Dig-
nāga about the grammarians’ and epistemological interpretations of kal-
panā (conceptual construction).  
Huiyuan goes on to define another aspect of perception as cognition 
of li (the universal), claiming that perception of li (the universal) occurs 
in the realm of desire (kāma-dhātu) only, while perception of shi (the par-
ticular) can occur in any realm and at any time. Now, the question arises: 
Why have these epistemological issues been brought into relation with 
the scheme of the tridhātu?  
In answering this question, we should bear in mind that Huiyuan was 
quite well versed in Abhidharma literature. According to the Abhidhar-
ma teaching, the tridhātu system corresponds to various mental states, 
which are achieved in accordance with various levels of meditation; the 
various modes of contemplation take place at particular stages on this 
gradated path of practice. Huiyuan illustrates the perception of li by 
citing a passage from the *Abhidharmavibhāṣā (translated by Buddhavar-
man and Daotai) which refers to the stage of laukikāgra-dharma (世第一
法) just preceding the entry into the outflow-free darśana-mārga.11 In the 
-------------------------------------------------- 
11 The stage of laukikāgra-dharma belongs to the mundane realm, whereas the path of in-
sight (darśana-mārga) belongs to the trans-mundane realm. 
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stage of laukikāgra-dharma (and in three other stages, viz. uṣmagata, 
mūrdhan, and kṣānti) the practitioner is trained to contemplate sixteen 
aspects (ākāra) of the Four Noble Truths. In regard to the truth of 
suffering, for instance, four aspects of phenomena are taken as the 
objects of contemplation: that they are impermanent (anitya), suffering 
(duḥkha), void (śūnya), and selfless (anātmaka).12 These sixteen aspects of 
the Four Noble Truths are also called “general marks” (zongxiang 總相) 
in the *Vibhāṣā, whereas the nature of specific phenomena, such as the 
nature of rūpa, vijñāna, etc., is called “particular marks” (biexiang 別相).13  
In the DSYZ, Huiyuan characterizes the sixteen aspects of the Four 
Noble Truths as li (the universal), while characterizing individual object 
as shi (the particular), as can be seen in his exposition of the ten forms of 
knowledge (jñāna):  
According to the Abhidharma, “knowledge of suffering” refers to 
knowing the universal (li 理) comprising the four aspects of suffering 
by means of understanding (prajñā) with outflow (sāsrava). “Know-
ledge of the cause of suffering” refers to knowing the universal com-
prising the four aspects of the cause of suffering. “Knowledge of 
cessation” refers to knowing the universal comprising the four as-
pects of cessation. “Knowledge of the path” refers to knowing the 
universal comprising the four aspects of the path…” Dharma know-
ledge (dharma-jñāna 法智) and inferential knowledge” (anvaya-jñāna 
比智) refers to knowing the universal (li) of the sixteen aspects of the 
Four Truths by means of the understanding without outflow. “Con-
ventional knowledge” (saṃvṛti-jñāna 等智) refers to knowing either 
-------------------------------------------------- 
12 Cf. Hirakawa, 1990: 210. The meaning of ākāra in this context is subject to various 
interpretations. Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti explains “ākāra” as “the mode of compre-
hending activity of the mind” which “results in a resemblance or reflection of the 
object in the mind”. See Dhammajoti, 2007: 581; cf. Wayman, 1984: 117-127. 
13 *Abhidharmavibhāṣā: “‘Contemplation of the particular mark’ is named for contempla-
tion of the mark of form as form, up to contemplation of the mark of consciousness as 
consciousness, and contemplation of the mark of earth as solidness, up to contempla-
tion of the mark of wind as fluidness. ‘Contemplation of the general mark’ is named 
for contemplation of the sixteen holy marks” (T28:1546.40a22-25). 別相觀者觀色是色
相，乃至觀識是識相，觀地是堅相，乃至觀風是動相，是名別相觀。總相觀者十六
聖行觀，是名總相觀. 
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the universal or particular [aspect] of all existents with outflow. Four 
types of mind in the stages of warmth (uṣmagata), etc., and the rest of 
conventional knowledge, which take the universal of the Noble 
Truths as the object of knowledge, are called “knowing the universal” 
(zhi li 知理), while the other types of knowledge are called “knowing 
the particular” (zhi shi 知事).14  
It should be noted that Huiyuan here employs the Sinitic concepts, li and 
shi, to interpret these Abhidharma doctrines. The term li is used to refer 
to the sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths as the universal charac-
teristics of phenomena, while shi refers to phenomena which can be 
further defined by their different natures. Li and shi refer respectively to 
the two aspects of the object of meditation, the “universal” (sāmānya-
‌lakṣaṇa) and the “particular” (svalakṣaṇa), as can be demonstrated by 
comparison of Huiyuan’s treatment with Vasubandhu’s account of the 
four methods of mindfulness in the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya.15 (Although 
the categories of universal and particular are applied to the analysis of 
the object of meditation in the Abhidharma literature, it seems that a 





心及餘等智緣諦理者，名為知理，餘名知事 (T44:1851.760a-b). For the ten forms of 
knowledge, see Dhammajoti 2007: 319-322. 
15 Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, VI: “Verse: In order to practice mindfulness for 
contemplation that is based on the accomplished state of concentration, one contem-
plates one’s own body, feelings, thoughts and concepts in terms of particular and 
universal. Comment: One practices the four kinds of mindfulness for vipaśyanā when 
he has accomplished the supreme śamatha. How does one practice the four kinds of 
mindfulness? Answer: One contemplates the universal aspect and the particular aspect 
of body, feelings, thoughts and concepts. ‘The particular’ refers to the specific nature 
(svabhāva) of body, feelings, thoughts and concepts. ‘The universal’ refers to the fact 
that: (1) all conditioned objects are by nature impermanent; (2) all defilements are un-
satisfactory by nature; and (3) all objects are by nature empty and non-self.” 頌曰：依
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and inference, on the one hand, and the particular and perception, on 
the other, appeared no earlier than the age of Dignāga’s epistemology.) 
In his account of Buddhist epistemology, Huiyuan clearly states that 
each object of cognition consists of both li and shi. It is commonly grant-
ed that shi refers to existents (dharmas) categorized as skandhas, dhātus 
and āyatanas. As to li, according to Huiyuan’s classification of the teach-
ings (panjiao 判教), the Vaibhāṣikas hold that li refers to the sixteen 
aspects of the Four Noble Truths, while the Sautrāntikas, Mādhyamikas 
and Tathāgatagarbha thinkers each hold different theories.16 (Huiyuan 
also investigates the ontology of li and shi in his analysis of the Twofold 
Truth. We will come back to this issue later.17) In the context of the clas-
-------------------------------------------------- 
16 DSYZ: “In the fourth section [of the exposition], the realm of the object will be 
examined first and then the exposition of cognition will follow. The object [of 
cognition] consists of two kinds: the thing/particular (shi) and the principle/universal 
(li). ‘The thing/particular’ refers to the aggregates (skandha), realms (dhātu), bases 
(āyatana), and so forth. As for the principle/universal, there is no fixed theory. Accord-
ing to the Abhidharma, the sixteen holy aspects are named principle/universal. The 
sixteen holy aspects are explained above in detail. Under the category of suffering, 
there are four subcategories: suffering [itself], impermanence, emptiness, and no-self. 
Under the category of the arising of suffering, there are four [subcategories]: the cause 
[of suffering], the gathering [of karmic fruits], coming into existence, and conditions. 
Under the category of cessation, there are four [subcategories]: cessation [itself], 
calming, sublimity, and detachment. Under the category of the path, there are four 
[subcategories]: the path [itself], accordance [with correct principle], trace, and vehic-
le. According to the *Satyasiddhi, the principle/universal (li) means that all objects are 
linguistic designations for all that arises with causes and conditions, i.e., all things that 
are empty of self-nature. According to the Mahāyāna teachings, the principle/‌univer-
sal refers to the twofold truth: ‘conventional truth’ refers to that which exists in 
causes and conditions, whereas ‘ultimate truth’ refers to that which does not exist in 
causes and conditions. ‘Principle/universal’ also refers to the one principle of reality, 
i.e., the nature of tathāgatagarbha, which is neither existence nor nonexistence. This is 






17 DSYZ: “As to the principle/universal and the thing/particular, the distinction of phe-
nomena into skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas is designated as conventional truth, 
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sification of teachings Huiyuan analyzes different accounts of the 
various modes of perception that occur at the different stages of medi-
tation:  
(1) the Vaibhāṣika Theory: “‘Perception’ is named for the vividness of 
perception in the realm of desire only. In the realm of desire, there 
are two kinds of perception. The first is called ‘perception detached 
from desire’, while the second is called ‘direct perception by oneself’.” 
(2) the Sautrāntika Theory: “According to the teaching in the 
*Satyasiddhi, perception is analyzed into two types in terms of time: 
The first type of perception refers to the contemplation of the non-
substantiality of prajñapti right at the initial stage of practice, which is 
conducted during the present moment before the Realization of Truth 
(dṛṣṭa-satya, jiandi 見諦). The second type of perception refers to 
intuition of the principle of emptiness (kongli 空理) in the existents 
of the past, the present and the future, which occurs after the 
Realization of Truth.”  
(3) the Mahāyāna Theory: “Perception is analyzed in terms of the four 
stages of meditation.  
i) “At the initial stage of meditation, perception refers to the 
seeing of the tathatā of present existents in the realm of desire.  
ii) “At the subsequent stage of meditation, perception refers to ei-
ther the seeing of the tathatā of existents in the realm of desire 
in the past, the present and the future, or to the seeing of the 
tathatā of present existents in the three realms.  
iii) “At the completion of meditation, perception refers to the 
intuitive seeing of the tathatā of all existents by the practition-
er himself in all three time-periods.  
iv) “At the cessation of meditation, perception refers to the 
intuitive seeing of all existents in the three time-periods during 
-------------------------------------------------- 
whereas the principle as the general characteristics of the sixteen holy aspects is 
taken as the ultimate truth” 言理事者，陰界入等事相差別說為世諦，十六聖行通相
之理以為真諦 (T44:1581.484a). 
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the stage of awakening (bodhi), whether by oneself or by 
others.” 
In the above account, the theory of perception is further explained ac-
cording to the classification of teachings. Although each teaching has its 
own theory of perception, they all agree in analyzing perception in 
terms of the stages of meditation, which are arranged according to dif-
ferent teachings. 
Inference  
Huiyuan defines “inference” as “knowing dharmas through analogical 
reasoning (pidu 譬度)”. Nothing about this definition looks peculiar. 
What is peculiar is that, unlike Dignāga, Huiyuan once more includes 
both the universal/principle (li) and the particular/thing (shi) as the ob-
ject of inference. As in the above exposition of perception, Huiyuan ex-
plains the inferential cognition of the particular first, claiming that it is 
the cognition of existents that are known through inference in any 
realm and any time. Then, Huiyuan proceeds to explain the inferential 
cognition of the universal, using the hermeneutical framework of the 
classification of teachings. (1) According to the Abhidharma, inference 
refers to cognition of the universal (li) of the Four Noble Truths in the 
upper realms (the realm of form and the formless realm) only. (2) Ac-
cording to the *Satyasiddhi, inference refers to the cognition of the non-
substantiality of conventional existents (prajñapti, jia 假) in the past and 
the future, which takes place before the path of insight. (3) According to 
Mahāyāna doctrine, inference can be further analyzed in accordance 
with the three progressive stages of meditation. In the process of 
cultivation, the practitioner is trained to inferentially cognize Suchness 
(tathatā) either in other realms, or in other time-periods, through his 
knowledge of truth in the realm of desire. In the final state of 
enlightenment, by contrast, one does not need any inference to cognize 
the truth; one intuitively perceives the truth. In short, for Huiyuan, 
inference is mainly conceived as the means for cognizing Suchness 
(tathatā), which is the same as li, during the progressive course of 
cultivation. 
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Huiyuan goes on to analyze the method of inference into three types: 
(1) The first type of inference is called “analogy from the same species”. 
That is, through knowing one item in a given category, one analogically 
knows the rest of the items in the same category. (2) The second type of 
inference is called “giving a case of lower quality in order to know other 
cases of higher quality”. For instance, one uses copper as an analogy for 
those who have never seen gold. (3) The third type of inference is called 
“giving a case of higher quality in order to know other cases of lower 
quality”. For instance, one uses gold as an example for those who have 
never seen copper. Another example is that in the scriptures, the hypo-
thetical case of a king being sentenced to death is taken as an example 
for knowing neither the existence nor the non-existence of supreme nir-
vāṇa.18  
Under the first type of inference, “analogy from the same species”, 
Huiyuan lists three sub-types, which are adopted from Qingmu’s (青目
*Piṅgala) account of pramāṇa theory as preserved in the Zhong lun (Com-
mentary on MMK). (In the SLZY, Huiyuan obviously mistakes Āryadeva’s 
Śata-śāstra for Qingmu’s Zhong lun.) The three sub-modes of inference are 
listed as follows: 
(1) Inference from part to whole (*śeṣavat, rucan 如殘). For instance, 
one can infer the saltiness of the water of the entire ocean by tasting 
the saltiness of a single drop. For another instance, one can infer that 
all existents are characterized by suffering, impermanence, emptiness 
and no-self, by cognizing these same characteristics in one existent.  
(2) Inference from effect to cause (*pūrvavat, ruben 如本). For instance, 
when one sees the smoke from a fire, he knows that there must be fire 
whenever there is smoke. 
(3) Inference from common relation (*sāmānyatoḍṛṣṭa, gongxiang bizhi
共相比知). For instance, someone observes the movement of a man 
from the east to the west. When he similarly observes the movement 
of the sun in the sky from the east to the west, he then analogically 
-------------------------------------------------- 
18 That is to say, the impossibility of characterizing nirvāṇa is similar to the impossibility 
of prosecuting the King for a capital crime. 
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infers that the sun also moves, like human beings. For another 
instance, someone observes the impermanence of material form (rūpa) 
by observing the production and destruction of that [same] material 
form. He then infers the impermanence of conception, feelings, voli-
tions, etc., by observing the production and destruction of these same 
elements.  
We know that the above three sub-types of inference, as recorded in the 
oldest Chinese translations of Indian texts, namely the Zhong lun, the 
*Upāyahṛdaya (Fangbian xin lun 方便心論) and the *Suvarṇasaptati-śāstra 
(Jin qishi lun 金七十論), are also found in parallel sources in the Nyāya-
sūtras and Vātsyāyana’s Nyāya-bhāṣya (Ui, 1944: 71-72; Katsura, 1998: 
36-‌39; Potter, 1977: 184, 223, 242; Jhā, 1983: 153-155). Although there is 
some discrepancy and inconsistency of interpretation among these texts, 
it is quite certain that the old theory of inference found in the early Chi-
nese translations was inherited from pan-Indian logical sources which 
were accepted in common by the Buddhists, the Naiyāyikas and the 
Sāṃkhyas. 
Authoritative teaching 
The third means of valid cognition is authoritative teaching (āptāgama). 
Unlike Dignāga, who incorporated āgama/śabda as part of the inference, 
Huiyuan still holds fast to the independent value of authoritative teach-
ing handed down from the tradition. He defines “authoritative teaching” 
as “that by which one knows profound dharmas that it is beyond one’s 
own capability to learn”. By means of this third pramāṇa of authoritative 
teaching, one is, once again, able to know both li and shi; and once again, 
li and shi are viewed in the theoretical framework of the Two Truths. 
Knowledge of shi, whether acquired by perception, inference, or autho-
ritative teaching, belongs to the conventional realm. On the other hand, 
knowledge of li belongs to the trans-conventional realm.  
In terms of its application, Huiyuan emphasizes that authoritative 
teaching (āgama) allows us to penetrate the most profound teachings, 
such as the teaching of Buddha-nature or tathāgatagarbha, which is re-
garded by Huiyuan as the most profound teaching. It seems that Huiyuan 
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endorses the value of authoritative teaching simply for the reason that 
he wants to make sense of the seemingly unfathomable thought of tathā-
gatagarbha. 
Concluding remarks 
How did Huiyuan contextualize his understanding of pramāṇavāda with 
the very limited sources available in sixth-century China? As probably 
the first Chinese scholar-monk to systematize Indian Buddhist epistemo-
logy, Huiyuan did not construct his knowledge of pramāṇavāda by means 
of hermeneutic speculation only. In his efforts at systematization, rather, 
he relied upon the textual and doctrinal sources available to him. Hui-
yuan arranges those Buddhist doctrines, ranging from Abhidharma to 
Yogācāra, and from Madhyamaka to Tathāgatagarbha, according to a 
peculiarly Sinitic mode of classification (panjiao). In this regard, Huiyuan 
can be counted as one of the pioneers in creating a Buddhist hermeneu-
tics of reading and practice. Unlike Dignāga, who attempted to lay down 
logic and epistemology as the universal foundation for all Indian philo-
sophical systems, including Buddhist and non-Buddhist, Huiyuan rather 
attempted to demonstrate that epistemology is relative to the various 
stages of intellectual and spiritual cultivation. Everything, including 
cognition, is condition-dependent. Hence, perception for the beginner in 
the path of mental cultivation is naturally different from perception for 
the practitioner at an advanced stage. The same is true for inference and 
authoritative teaching. For Huiyuan, then, pramāṇas are indeed instru-
ments to soteriological ends. They cannot be taken as autonomous do-
mains and universal disciplines, as we see logic and epistemology are 
treated as modern academic fields of inquiry. In this sense, Huiyuan did 
preserve the authentic intent of Indian Buddhist epistemology.  
The most striking feature of Huiyuan’s pramāṇa theory is that it 
brings into epistemological discourse the ontological categories of li and 
shi (“particular” and “universal”, but with special Chinese overtones). 
Huiyuan’s application of this hermeneutics of li and shi to the episte-
mological enterprise might appear to make for a classic proof-case for 
the theory of Sinification; he might be regarded as simply looking at 
Indic materials through a Sinitic lens. On such an interpretation, the on-
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tological terminology of li and shi, which are deliberately employed by 
Huiyuan as equivalents to the notions of svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa, 
would constitute strong evidence in support of the theory of Sinification. 
However, before we jump to this conclusion, we should carefully exa-
mine Huiyuan’s ontology of li and shi in detail.  
To anticipate my conclusion, Huiyuan’s pramāṇa theory can be seen as 
the result of a dialectical interplay between Sinification and Indian-
ization. The main reason we might ascribe Huiyuan’s project to Sini-
fication is the fact that he adopts typical Sinitic terms, especially li and 
shi, equivalents of which had never been seen in Indian Buddhist systems. 
However, as we have seen in detail above, Huiyuan is justified in employ-
ing the notions of li and shi by his move in viewing the problem of pra-
māṇas within the context of the progressive course of meditation as 
described in the Abhidharma literature. Li refers to the sixteen aspects of 
the Four Noble Truths, while shi refers to the individual object of medita-
tion. In virtue of this move, instead of reading Indian literature through 
a Sinitic lens, Huiyuan arguably reads conversely: that is, he reframes 
the semantics of li and shi in the terms of an Indian Buddhist context. As 
we have seen above, the categories of li and shi and the categories of 
svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa are taken to be compatible with each 
other. This is, then, a case of Indianization.  
On the other hand, the phenomenon of Sinification did take place at 
the level of the very basis of Huiyuan’s hermeneutical project, namely, 
the framework of panjiao, or “classification of teachings”. If we do not 
take Huiyuan’s hermeneutical project of panjiao into account, we cannot 
properly understand the theory of pramāṇas in SLZY. That is to say, 
Huiyuan’s theory of cognition should be viewed from the perspective of 
his ontology.  
As can be seen in the chapter on the Two Truths (erdi 二諦) in the 
DSYZ, Huiyuan deals with the problem of the ontological relationship 
between li and shi, or between svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa, within the 
hermeneutical framework of panjiao. He examines the relationship be-
tween li and shi in four Buddhist schools. Briefly, according to Huiyuan’s 
account, the relationship between li and shi is treated by the Sarvāsti-
vādins as indeterminate; on the one hand, they are identical, because li is 
the ontological principle of the variety of phenomena (shi); on the other 
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hand, however, they are different, because phenomena (shi) are not un-
conditioned existents. For the Sautrāntikas, li and shi are conceived as 
both identical and different; they are differentiated, because shi exists as 
convention (psycho-linguistic construction, prajñapti), and is therefore 
not ultimately empty in the sense of li. For the Mādhyamikas, li and shi 
are regarded as completely identical. Finally, for the Tathāgatagarbha 
school, the relationship between li and shi is conceived in terms of ti (體 
substance) and yong (用 function). Ontologically, principle (li) serves as 
the transcendental ground of phenomena (shi). The relationship between 
li and shi is also conceived to be both identical and different on the 
Tathāgatagarbha interpretation (DSYZ, T44:1851.485).  
We might be tempted to speculatively identify the Sinitic and the 
Indic ways of thinking with ontological and epistemological thinking re-
spectively. If we adopt this view, then Huiyuan’s system demonstrates 
the feasibility of creatively weaving both Sinitic ontology and Indic epis-
temology into one system. This possibility may provide a clue toward an 
answer to the question raised at the beginning of this chapter, namely: Is 
it justifiable for both li and shi to be taken as the object of cognition for 
each of the pramāṇas, namely, perception, inference and authoritative 
teaching?  
The seeds of a resolution of this apparent difficulty may lie in the fact 
that, quite apart from factors proper to Indic systems, li and shi are al-
ways considered by Huiyuan as ontologically both identical and different. 
For Dignāga, however, sāmānyalakṣaṇa and svalakṣaṇa (or li and shi) 
should be kept strictly separate, because according to the theory of the 
Two Truths that he adopted from the Abhidharma, svalakṣaṇa is con-
ceived as ultimately real, while sāmānyalakṣaṇa is conceived as merely 
prajñapti-sat.19 This means that according to Huiyuan’s classification, 
Dignāga would be considered as still belonging to the lowest rank of 
teaching, namely the teaching of svabhāva (li xing zong 立性宗), while 
Huiyuan considers his own position to be the final teaching, that of 
disclosing reality (xian shi zong 顯實宗). For Huiyuan, the enterprise of 
-------------------------------------------------- 
19 Dan Arnold contends that Dignāga “retains the basically Ābhidharmika notion of the 
‘two truths’” as a basis for the ontological separation of svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa. 
Arnold, 2005: 23. 
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epistemology should be taken only as a step on the path to the full dis-
closure of ontological reality. 
  
 Epistemology and Cultivation in Huiyuan 85 
 
Appendix: English translation of Huiyuan’s Essay on the Three Means 
of Valid Cognition 
大乘義章   Treatise on the Meanings of the Great Vehicle 
遠法師撰   Dharma Master Yuan 
三量智義三門分別 (釋名義一 辨相二 就位分別三)  
Threefold Analysis of the Three Means of Valid Cognition (Exposition of Termi-
nology, Examination of Characteristics, and Analysis According to the 
Ranks of Cultivation)  





The meaning of the three means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) is found in 
the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra.20 These are termed “means of valid cognition” 
because each [aspect of] cognitive mind apprehends the specific aspect 
of objects. Regarding the number of the means of valid cognition, there 
are different theories. One theory holds that it [i.e., the means of valid 
cognition] can be divided into three types: (1) perception (pratyakṣa), (2) 
inference (anumāna) and (3) scripture (āptāgama). This typology is also 
seen in the Bodhisattvabhūmi and the *Satyasiddhi-śāstra. In the Bodhi-
sattvabhūmi, [the three means of valid cognition are named as] per-
ceptual knowledge (xianzhi 現智), inferential knowledge (bizhi 比智) 
and [the knowledge of] hearing from the teacher (cong shi tong wen 從師
-------------------------------------------------- 
20 In the Xiangxu jietuo rulaisuozuo suishunchu liaoyi jing 相續解脫如來所作隨順處了義經 
(*Saṃdhinirmocanatathāgatakṛtyānuṣṭhānanītārtha-sūtra), trans., Guṇabhadra, three 
types of pramāṇa are listed: perception (xianqianliang 現前量), inference (biliang 比
量), and testimony (xinyanliang 信言量) (T16:679.679b5-6). 
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同聞).21 According to the *Satyasiddhi-śāstra, the three are called “seeing” 






Regarding perception (pratyakṣa), it is so named because [it refers to] the 
immediate cognition of objects. It is also named “perception” (xian 現) 
for the reason that it refers to cognition of present objects (xianfa 現法). 
Perception can be further analyzed into two types: (1) cognition of the 
particular/thing (shi 事), and (2) cognition of the universal/principle (li 
理). Regarding “cognition of the particular/thing”, the cognition of 
objects in any time and any place without the aid of reasoning and ver-
bal testimony is also named “perception”, because the characteristics of 
the particular/thing are coarse and near (i.e., observable), and can be im-
mediately perceived anytime and anywhere. In terms of “cognition of 
the universal/principle”, according to the Abhidharma theory of place 
(chu 處), “perception” is so named because it refers to the cognition of 









21 Pusadichi jing (菩薩地持經 Bodhisattvabhūmi), trans. Dharmakṣema (T30:1581.893a). 
22 Chengshilun (成實論 *Satyasiddhi-śāstra), trans., Kumārajīva: “Question: What is the 
distinction between seeing, hearing, comprehension, and knowing? Answer: There are 
three reliable sources (xin 信 = pramāṇa). Seeing is termed ‘perception’ (xian zaixin 現
在信). Hearing is termed ‘testimony’ (xin xiansheng yu 信賢聖語). Knowing is termed 
‘inference’ (bizhi 比知). Comprehension is termed the discernment of the three reli-
able sources of cognition.” 問曰：見聞覺知，有何差別？答曰：有三種信。見名現
在信，聞名信賢聖語，知名比知，覺名分別三種信慧 (T32:1646.304a). 




In what sense is “perception” specifically named for the cognition of 
objects in the realm of desire only? It is stated in the *Abhidharmavibhāṣā 
(T28:1546.10c, 303c) that correct certainty (samyaktvaniyata, zhengjueding 
正決定) must be attained in the realm of desire. A practitioner is able to 
perceive [suffering and so forth] in the upper realms only after he has 
perceived suffering and so forth in the realm of desire. One perceives the 
objects in the realm of desire first, for the reason that they are coarse 
and easy to perceive (i.e., observable). “Perception” is so named speci-
fically due to the vividness of initial perception. Due to the lack of vivid-
ness in the upper realms, knowledge in the upper realms is not named 
“perception”.  
Further, the practitioner has two types of perception of suffering in 
the realm of desire: The first is called “perception detached from desire” 
(li yu xianjian 離欲現見) for the reason that [suffering] is immediately 
cognized in the path of detaching from desire. The second is called 
“direct perception by oneself” (zishen xianjian 自身現見) for the reason 
that suffering in the realm of desire is perceived by oneself. Regarding 
suffering in the upper realms, there is only one type of perception, that 
which is detached from desire, because the physical body is not in that 
[i.e., pain]. This is just as there are two ways of carrying an object: one 
way is to carry the object yourself, while the other way is to ask someone 
to carry the object for you. With respect to an object that you are 
carrying yourself, there are two forms of perception: one is perception of 
the object, while the other is perception of its weight. The situation 
when we cognize suffering in the realm of desire is similar to this. As for 
an object that is being carried by someone else, there is only one form of 
perception, i.e., perception of the object, without the awareness of its 
weight. The same is true in the upper realms. Accordingly, perception is 
so named for two types of perception [i.e., perception detached from 
desire and perception by oneself] in the realm of desire. Since there is 
only one type of perception in the upper realms, it is therefore not 
named “perception”.  










According to the teaching in the *Satyasiddhi, perception is analyzed into 
two forms in terms of time: The first form of perception refers to the 
contemplation of the non-substantiality of prajñapti right at the initial 
stage of cultivation, which is conducted during the present moment 
before the [the moment of] Insight into the Truth (jiandi 見諦). The sec-
ond form of perception refers to intuition of the Principle of Emptiness 
(kongli 空理) in the objects of the past, the present and the future, which 
occurs after the Realization of Truth. This is also termed “perception”.  
According to the Mahāyāna exposition in terms of time and place, 
perception refers to that which takes place at four stages:  
(1) At the initial stage of cultivation, perception refers to seeing pre-
sent objects as they are (tathatā) in the realm of desire, for it is easier 
to investigate present objects in the realm of desire.  
(2) At the subsequent stage of cultivation, perception refers either to 
seeing the tathatā of objects in the realm of desire in the past, the 
present and the future, or to seeing the tathatā of present objects in 
the three realms.  
(3) At the completion of cultivation, perception refers to the intuitive 
seeing of the tathatā of all objects by the practitioner himself in all 
three time-periods.  
(4) At the cessation of cultivation, perception refers to the intuitive 
seeing of all objects in three time-periods during the stage of awak-
ening (bodhi), either by oneself or by another. Hence it says in the 
Bodhisattvabhūmi that the Buddhas are directly aware of all dharmas.  
Thus is explained perception. 













As to inference, it refers to the knowing of dharmas through analogy and 
reasoning, which can be analyzed into two kinds: (1) knowing the partic-
ular/thing and (2) knowing the universal/principle. Regarding “knowing 
the particular/thing”, knowing objects anytime and anywhere through 
reasoning is named “inference”. Regarding “knowing the universal/prin-
ciple”, according to the Abhidharma theory of place, “inference” is so 
named because it refers to reasoning that knows the universal aspect of 
the Four Truths in the two upper realms. According to the *Satyasiddhi’s 
analysis in terms of time, inference refers to the contemplation of the 
non-substantiality of prajñapti in the objects of the past and the future 
right before the [the moment of] Insight into the Truth.  
According to the Mahāyāna exposition in terms of time and place, in-
ference refers to that which takes place in three stages:  
(1) At the initial stage of cultivation, inference is named for that 
which analogically knows the tathatā of objects in other realms and 
time-periods by knowing the tathatā of present objects in the realm of 
desire.  
(2) At the subsequent stage of cultivation, inference is named either 
for that which analogically knows [the tathatā of objects in the three 
time-periods] in the two upper realms through knowing the tathatā of 
objects in the three time-periods in the realm of desire, or for that 
which analogically knows [the tathatā of objects] in the past and the 
future through knowing the tathatā of objects in the present in all 
three realms.  
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(3) At the completion of cultivation, inference refers to analogically 
knowing the tathatā of all objects in the three realms and the three 
time-periods, which has not been realized by others, through one’s 
own knowledge of the tathatā of objects in the three realms and the 
three time-periods. 
[Question:] For what reason is the cessation of cultivation not included 
[in the Mahāyāna exposition of inference]? [Answer:] It is because there 
is no inference at the stage of awakening. However, according to the 
sūtras, inference is also called “analogy” (upamā, piyu liang 譬喻量). Gen-
erally speaking, both are the same. On further analysis, however, infer-
ence is named for inferring analogically between members of the same 
species, while analogy is named for inferring analogically between mem-







Regarding teaching (āgama) as a means of valid cognition, this refers to 
those teachings by which one knows profound dharmas that it would be 
beyond one’s capacity to learn on one’s own. It can be further analyzed 
into two forms: (1) knowing the particular/thing (shi) and (2) knowing 
the universal/principle (li). The knowledge of the particular/thing refers 
to the conventional truth (saṁvṛti-satya) which is attained through 
teachings. The knowledge of universal/principle refers to those univer-
sals/principles of the Two Truths which are attained through teachings.  
Teachings in this sense are also called “verbal testimony” (xinyan liang 
信言量). Generally speaking, these two are the same. If we analyze more 
precisely, “verbal testimony” refers to those words by which one is led 
to apprehend dharmas that are close to one’s own [knowledge], while 
“authoritative teaching” refers to that by which one is led to know 
profound and unfathomable dharmas. Accordingly, some classify means 
of valid cognition into four types: (1) perception, (2) inference, (3) autho-
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ritative teaching and (4) testimony. Although this classification does no 
harm, it is not the way the scriptures and treatises define things. 













First, perception, which requires no further analysis.  
Second, inference is of three types:  
(1) Analogy from the same species. That is, by knowing one example 
in a category of similar objects, one analogically knows the remaining 
objects. As is pointed out in The Treatise in One Hundred Verses 
(*Śata-śāstra, Bai lun 百論), there are three such modes of inference:24  
i) The first mode is called “inference from part to whole” (*śeṣavat, 
rucan 如殘).25 For instance, someone infers the saltiness of the 
water of the entire ocean by tasting the saltiness of a single drop. 
For another instance, someone infers that all objects are charac-
terized by suffering, impermanence, emptiness and non-self by 
cognizing [these same characteristics] in one object.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
23 This form of analogical reasoning is found in Vaiśeṣika. Cf., Takemura 1986: 7. 
24 Huiyuan misidentified the textual source. The correct source is seen in Kumārajīva’s 
translation of The Middle Treatise (Zhong lun), T30:1564.24b.  
25 Cf. Schuster, 1972. 
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ii) The second mode is called “inference from effect to cause” 
(*pūrvavat, ruben 如本). For instance, when someone sees the 
smoke that comes from a fire, he knows that there must be fire 
whenever there is smoke, and so on for all objects. For another 
instance, when someone knows that all objects are characterized 
by suffering because they are impermanent, he comes to know 
that a certain object must be impermanent when he sees that the 
same object is characterized by suffering, and so on for all objects.  
iii) The third mode is called “inference from common relation” 
(*sāmānyatodṛṣta, gongxiang bizhi 共相比知). For instance, someone 
observes a man moving from the east to the west. He then 
analogically infers (lei 類) that the sun must also move, because he 
has also observed the sun shift its position in the sky from the east 
to the west. For another instance, someone observes the imperma-
nence of material form (rūpa) by observing the production and de-
struction of the [same] material form. He then infers the imperma-
nence of conception, feeling, volition, etc. through observing the 
production and destruction of these same elements; and similarly 
for all cases.  
The above three modes are named “analogy from the same species”.  
(2) The second mode of inference is called “giving an example of 
lower quality for other cases of higher quality”. For instance, one uses 
copper as an analogy for those who have never seen gold. Another in-
stance is that in the scriptures the Buddha-nature is made known by 
using the analogy of the non-production and non-destruction of 
space; and similarly for all cases.  
(3) The third mode of inference is called “giving an example of higher 
quality for other cases of lower quality”. For instance, one uses gold 
as an example for those who have never seen copper. Another ex-
ample is that in the scriptures, the fact that supreme nirvāṇa neither 
exists nor does not exist is taken as a case similar to the case of a king 
being sentenced to death ; and similarly for all cases.  
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The last two modes of analogy are also subsumed under the general 
category of “analogy between two parties”, for both parties share a com-







Third, the teaching as a means of cognition can be analyzed into three 
types:  
(1) Objects in another time can be known through teaching. For in-
stance, the objects of the past and the future can be known only 
through teaching, because they are not directly perceived.  
(2) Objects in another place can be known through teaching. For 
instance, objects in another place can be known only through hearsay, 
because they are not directly perceived.  
(3) For that which exists in the same time and the same place, 
teachings can also be required for cognition, such as when it is ex-
plained that the nature of the Tathāgata [exists] in the body.  
Thus is explained the teaching as a means of cognition.  
That which is known by the teaching as the means of cognition varies 
in nature. Some profound dharmas can only be known through the teach-
ing, such as Buddha-nature, nirvāṇa, the path, etc.26 Some dharmas of 
middling quality, such as suffering, the causes of suffering, etc., can 
[also] be known only through the teaching. Some superficial and coarse 
dharmas, such as points in the mundane world that can be known only 
with difficulty, can [also] be known only through teaching. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
26 “Indeterminate” (buding 不定) means “not determined in time and place”. 
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“Rank” refers to [the rank of cultivation attained by]: (1) the gotra 
formed by learning (xizhong 習種, samudānītaṃ gotram); (2) the gotra 
formed by nature (xingzhong 性種, prakṛtisthaṃ gotram); (3) determinate 
comprehension [of the trans-mundane path] (jiexing 解行, adhimukti-
caryā); (4) the ten stages (bhūmi); and (5) the stage of Buddhahood. There 
are three ways of analyzing the meaning [of pramāṇa] in terms of rank-
ing.  
First, the five ranks can be re-arranged into three. The rank of the 
gotra formed by learning and the rank of the gotra formed by nature 
remain unchanged, while Ranks 3, 4 and 5 are combined as one, for all of 
the [last] three take tathatā as the object of contemplation. According to 
this mode of ranking, on one interpretation, the three pramāṇas can be 
explained with reference to an object [of contemplation] common to [all] 
three ranks [Ranks 1, 2 and 3-5 respectively]. That is to say, from the 
perspective of the gotra formed by learning [Rank 1], the object of con-
templation in Ranks 3-5 is taken as [the object known through] the 
teaching as a means of cognition, because it is so profound that it can be 
apprehended only through teaching; from the perspective of the gotra 
formed by nature [Rank 2], the object of contemplation in Ranks 3-5 is 
taken as the [object known through the] inference as a means of cog-
nition, because that rank is close to the next rank and can know it by 
inference; [whereas] from the perspective of determinate comprehen-
sion and beyond [Ranks 3-5], their own object of contemplation is taken 
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as the [object perceived by] perception as a means of cognition, because 
it is directly perceived. 
On an alternate interpretation, the three pramāṇas can be explained 
with reference to viewing separately three [different] objects [of con-
templation] from the perspective of a single [given] rank. That is to say, 
the gotra formed by learning reflectively views by perception the object 
which it directly perceives itself, because it is directly perceived; [the 
same gotra] views by inference the object perceived by the gotra formed 
by nature, because the ranks are close to each other, and [that object] 
therefore can be known by analogical inference; [the same gotra] views 
by means of the teaching the object perceived by determinate compre-
hension and beyond [i.e., Ranks 3-5], for the object is profound and un-
fathomable. [Similarly], as the stage of cultivation advances, the teaching 
becomes shallower, while perception deepens;27 however, in this stage, 
perception is [yet] shallow, while the teaching is deep.  
On yet another interpretation, [the three pramāṇas can be explained 
with reference to] separately viewing three objects of contemplation 
from the perspective of the three [re-arranged] ranks of cultivation. 
From the perspective of the advanced three ranks, [the object attained at 
each stage itself respectively] is [known by] perception. Accordingly, 
perception [in the three ranks] is common to all ranks of cultivation, 





In the second analysis, the first two ranks and the last two ranks are 
combined as one respectively, while the middle is left unchanged. As is 
mentioned in the Bodhisattvabhūmi (T30:1581.888a), the rank of the gotra 
formed by learning and the rank of the gotra formed by nature are 
combined as one [rank], because they are equally rooted in seeds. [Ac-
cording to this re-arrangement,] adhimukti-caryā is the second rank. The 
-------------------------------------------------- 
27 That is to say, the portion of knowledge as a whole attained by direct perception 
grows ever larger, while the portion attained through the teaching dwindles. 
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first bhūmi and beyond are combined as the third rank, because they all 
perceive tathatā. According to this mode of analysis, also, the same object 
of contemplation can be viewed from the [perspective of all] three ranks; 
from the perspective of the rank of the gotras, the object perceived in the 
first bhūmi and beyond is [known] by the teaching as the means of cog-
nition; from the perspective of the rank of adhimukti-caryā, [it is known] 
by inference as the means of cognition; and from the perspective of the 
rank of the bhūmis, it is [known] by perception as the means of cognition. 
As explained in the above analysis, the objects of the three ranks can also 
be viewed from the perspective of each particular rank respectively; or 
the three objects [of contemplation] can be viewed from the perspective 







In the third analysis, the first [three ranks] are grouped as one, while the 
last [two] are left unchanged. The ranks of the gotra and the rank of 
adhimukti-caryā are combined as one, because they belong alike to the 
stage of faith; the ten stages belong to the second [rank]; and the stage of 
Buddhahood to the third [rank]. According to this mode of analysis, also, 
the same object of contemplation can be viewed differently from the 
perspective of each of the three ranks. From the viewpoint of the prepar-
atory rank [i.e., the rank prior to the ten stages], at the rank before the 
[ten] stages, the realization at the stage of Buddhahood is termed “teach-
ing”, because it is so profound and unfathomable that it can only be 
known through faith in the teaching. At the rank of the [ten] bhūmis, 
what is realized by the Buddha is termed “inference”, for it is analog-
ically known through what is realized [in the bhūmis]. At the rank of 
Buddhahood, [what is realized by the Buddha] is named “perception”, 
because the nature [of dharmas] (dharmatā) is directly realized. The 
object of contemplation in each of the three ranks can be also viewed 
from the viewpoint of each particular rank. From the viewpoint of the 
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rank prior to the ten stages, the object of cognition in that same rank is 
[known by] perception as a means of cognition, the object of cognition in 
the rank of ten bhūmis is [known by] inference as a means of cognition, 
and the object of cognition in the rank of Buddhahood is [known by] the 
teaching as a means of cognition, because it is so profound and unfatho-
mable. Also, the objects of cognition in the three ranks can be viewed 
separately from the viewpoint of each of the three ranks as [known by] 
perception as a cognitive means, because they are all directly cognized. 
Thus are explained the three means of cognition. 
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